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This article surveys selected developments in international litigation during 2013.1
I. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
A foreign state is presumptively immune from suit, and its property presumptively im-
mune from attachment and execution, unless an exception enumerated in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) applies.2 In Blue Ridge Investments, L.L. C. v. Republic of
Argentina, the Second Circuit held that the general rule permitting immediate appeal
under the collateral order doctrine of jurisdictional immunity denials applies even when
the action below seeks solely to confirm an arbitral award, but it concluded that it lacked
pendent appellate jurisdiction to also consider whether the plaintiff failed to state a claim. 3
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3. Blue Ridge Invs., L.L.C. v. Republic of Argentina, 735 F.3d 72, 81-82 (2d Cir. 2013).
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Applying these rulings, the court found that Argentina had waived its immunity to the
plaintiff's confirmation proceeding and explained that the court lacked jurisdiction over
the latter issue because it was not "inextricably intertwined" with the former.4 The Sec-
ond Circuit reasoned that holding otherwise would permit sovereigns to argue that "any
affirmative defense is 'inextricably intertwined'" with the FSIA determination, such that
"the limited exception of exercising pendent appellate jurisdiction would swallow the gen-
eral rule that [appellate courts] lack jurisdiction to consider non-appealable orders of dis-
trict courts."5
In Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the D.C. Circuit considered, for
the first time, whether intellectual property infringement occurring abroad can cause a
"direct effect" in the United States under the commercial activity exception to jurisdic-
tional immunity in section 1605(a)(2). 6 The plaintiffs alleged that by manufacturing and
marketing a helicopter that mimicked their own, Iran had infringed on their intellectual
property, which-notwithstanding the lack of any helicopter sales in the United States by
Iran-caused them financial and reputational harm in the United States.7 In holding that
the plaintiffs' evidence of harm was too "remote or speculative" to be considered a "direct
effect," the D.C. Circuit rejected the argument that infringement should be treated differ-
ently than other torts "because of the importance of protecting intellectual property,"
noting that such a rule "would eviscerate the jurisdictional immunity of foreign states" in
infringement cases with U.S. corporation plaintiffs.8
In Universal Trading & Investment Co. v. Bureau Jbr Representing Ukrainian Interests in
International and Foreign Courts, the First Circuit held that the Ukraine's contract with a
U.S. company to recover misappropriated sovereign assets satisfied section 1605(a)(2)'s
commercial activity exception. 9 The court reasoned that the activity was "indistinguish-
able from ordinary asset recovery services" performed for private parties and did not re-
quire the plaintiff "to perform any governmental finctions" itself.1° The First Circuit
distinguished other appellate decisions finding foreign-state service contracts sovereign in
nature as involving either government employee counterparties or an exercise of police
power." The court concluded that the activity had a sufficient nexus to the United States
because it was "carried on in the United States" (because the contract was offered and
negotiated there) and caused a "direct effect" in the United States (because the contract
was payable in Massachusetts).12
In NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, the Second Circuit affirmed injunctions
that required Argentina to pay plaintiff holders of defaulted debt 100 percent of their
claims, plus interest, as a condition to paying Argentina's restructured debt.' 3 The Second
4. Id. at 83-84.
5. Id. at 83.
6. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 734 F.3d 1175, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
7. Id. at 1178, 1184.
8. Id. at 1186.
9. Universal Trading & Inv. Co. v. Bureau for Representing Ukrainian Interests in Int'l and Foreign
Courts, 727 F.3d 10, 19-27 (1st Cir. 2013).
10. Id. at 20-21.
11. Id. at 23 (distinguishing Butters v. Vance Int'l, Inc., 225 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2000) and UNC Lear Servs.,
Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 581 F.3d 210 (5th Cir. 2009)).
12. Id. at 25-27.
13. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 240-41 (2013).
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Circuit found no violation of the FSIA, because the orders did not literally "attach, arrest,
or execute upon any property," but instead "allow[ed] Argentina to pay its [defaulted]
debts with whatever resources it likes." 14 The decision expanded the Second Circuit's
October 2012 decision finding that Argentina could be enjoined from servicing its restruc-
aired debt until it paid plaintiffs on their defaulted debt, even though no exception to
FSIA property immunity applied to the targeted funds.15 In that decision, the court dis-
tinguished precedent barring injunctions that finction as enforcement devices by reason-
ing that the contested orders did not exercise "dominion" over otherwise immune
sovereign property but rather compelled Argentina to comply with its purported contrac-
tual obligations under the paripassu clause in its defaulted debt.16 Recognizing the signifi-
cant nature of the case, the court extended its stay to permit Supreme Court review.1 7
II. International Service of Process
Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs international service of pro-
cess. Rule 4(f) requires that the international service of process comport with due process
and not be prohibited by an international agreement.' 8 Appellate courts did not signifi-
cantly address issues relating to international service of process in 2013. But the District
Court for the Southern District of New York reported two important opinions on interna-
tional service of process by social media.
In FTC v. PCCare247, Inc., the FTC sought leave to serve process on Indian defendants
by email and Facebook.' 9 Judge Engelmayer of the Southern District of New York noted
that the Federal Rules afforded courts "wide discretion in ordering service of process. ' 20
The court then determined that no international agreement prohibited service by email or
through FacebooL21 The United States and India are both signatories to the Hague Con-
vention that does not prohibit service of process by these means, and India did not specifi-
cally object to service of process by Facebook or email.22 The court found that it could
authorize service by Facebook and email, "provided that due process is also satisfied" 23 by
showing that service was "highly likely to reach defendants. '24 The court cautioned that if
plaintiffs were proposing to serve defendants only by Facebook, as opposed to a supple-
mental means of service, "a substantial question would arise whether that service comports
with due process."25 The court acknowledged that, in 2012, Judge Keenan of the South-
em District of New York had denied authorization for service by Facebook in Fortunato v.
14. Id.
15. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 2013
WL 3211846 (2013).
16. Id. at 262-63.
17. NML Capital, Ltd., 727 F.3d at 238.
18. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1) (an individual may be served outside of the United States "by any interna-
tionally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice"); FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3) (allowing
service "by other means not prohibited by international agreement").
19. FTC v. PCCare247, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31969, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013).
20. Id. at *7-8.
21. Id. at *9-11.
22. Id. at *9-10.
23. Id. at *11.
24. Id. at *18.
25. Id. at *15.
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Chase Bank USA.2 6 The court in PCCare247 distinguished the Fortunato case because,
there, the plaintiff did not show that the defendant actually maintained the Facebook-user
profile, whereas in PCCare247, the FTC provided screenshots of the Facebook pages to
show that the Facebook accounts were maintained and operated by the defendants.27 The
court firther stated that "[p]articularly where defendants have 'zealously embraced' a
comparatively new means of communication, it comports with due process to serve them
by those means. '
28
But in a later decision by Judge Engelmayer, the court refised to accept service of
process by Facebook in FTC v. Pecon Software Ltd.29 The court distinguished PCCare247
by noting that the FTC failed to provide the same evidence of actual use-screenshots of
the Facebook pages and summary table of information obtained by Facebook-as it had in
PCCare247.30 The court could not say with confidence that service would be "highly
likely to reach defendants" without actually viewing the Facebook pages and verifying the
information.
31
Despite the differences between the cases, the Southern District has embraced the view
that "as technology advances and modes of communication progress, courts must be open
to considering requests to authorize service via technological means of then-recent vin-
tage, rather than dismissing them out of hand as novel."32 Many foreign courts have al-
ready embraced international service of process, and it appears that U.S. courts will follow
suit as long as plaintiffs can show that such service is highly likely to accomplish the objec-
tive of actual notice and otherwise comports with due process.
III. Personal Jurisdiction
In the past year, the U.S. Supreme Court heard two personal jurisdiction cases that may
soon provide much needed clarity to currently unsettled jurisdictional principles. On Oc-
tober 15, 2013, the Court heard oral arguments in DaimlerChryslerAG v. Bauman,3 3 a case
in which the Ninth Circuit had held that DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft (DCAG), a
German parent company with no operations or employees in the United States, was sub-
ject to general jurisdiction in California. 34 The Ninth Circuit based minimum contacts on
the agency theory of personal jurisdiction, 35 reasoning that DCAG's wholly owned sub-
sidiary Mercedes Benz USA (MBUSA) performed "sufficiently important" services for
DCAG in California, i.e., selling Mercedes Benz vehicles, such that, if MBUSA did not
26. Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80594 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012).
27. FTC v. PCCare247, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31969, at *15-16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013).
28. Id. at *17.
29. FTC v. Pecon Software Ltd., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111375, at *23-25, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2013).
30. Id.
31. Id. at *24-25.
32. Id.
33. Transcript of Oral Argument, DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (No. 11-965)
[hereinafter DaimlerChrysler Tr.]. The case was decided in January 2014 and will be discussed in next year's
Year in Review.
34. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2011) (Bauman III), cert. granted, 133 S.
Ct. 1995 (Apr. 22, 2013) (No. 11-649).
35. See, e.g., Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851 (N.Y. 1967) (seminal opinion on agency
theory of personal jurisdiction).
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perform the services, DCAG's "own officials would undertake to perform substantially
similar services." 36
The primary facet of the Ninth Circuit decision that was challenged was the court's
expansive theory of agency. DCAG argued that most circuits refuse to recognize an
agency theory of general jurisdiction and only attribute contacts based on an alter-ego
relationship. If it did adopt an agency theory, DCAG urged the Court to require a show-
ing of actual control by the parent over the subsidiary, as opposed to simply the "right to
control" that the Ninth Circuit had found sufficient.37 At oral argument, DCAG, citing
the Court's recent Goodyear decision, 38 asked the Court to fashion a "clean rule" in which
a corporation could not be considered "at home" outside of the forum where it maintains
its principal place of business or place of incorporation. 39
If the Court finds that general jurisdiction over DCAG is lacking, the basis for the
holding will be critically important, especially in light of the lower courts' struggle with
applying Goodyear.40 The Court could reject the agency theory altogether and craft a
bright-line rule for general jurisdiction over corporations, or, given that the facts of
Bauman involve foreign parties and conduct occurring abroad, simply reject jurisdiction
on fairness grounds. 41
The other significant jurisdictional case before the Court is Walden v. Fiore, which in-
volves the proper scope and viability of the Calder v. Jones "effects test. ' 42 Two profes-
sional gamblers and residents of Nevada traveled to Puerto Rico where they legally won
U.S. $97,000.43 At a layover in Atlanta on their return trip, a Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration (DEA) agent seized the cash on the suspicion it had been obtained illegally.44
The DEA agent refused to return the money even after the couple sent documentation
verifying their winnings. 4 The gamblers brought a Bivens action against the DEA agent
in Nevada, but the district court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. 46
The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the DEA agent purposefully availed himself in
Nevada under the Calder effects test because, although the DEA agent never set foot in
Nevada, he (1) committed an intentional act (2) "expressly aimed" at Nevada that (3)
caused harm that the DEA agent knew was likely to be suffered in Nevada. 4r The dissent-
ing judges criticized the en banc decision as a "return to a discredited era of specific per-
36. Bauman, 644 F.3d at 921-22. To measure the "importance" of MBUSA's activity, the Ninth Circuit
emphasized that the U.S. market accounted for 19 percent of DCAG's Mercedes-Benz sales worldwide. Id. at
922.
37. Brief for Petitioner at 33, DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (No. 11-965).
38. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
39. DaimlerChrysler Tr. at 57.
40. See, e.g., Hess v. Bumbo Int'l Trust, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86969, at *17 (S.D. Tex. June 20, 2013)
(sustaining jurisdiction based on continuous and systematic sales); Ashbury Intern. Group, Inc. v. Cadex De-
fence, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134878 (W.D. Va. Sept. 20, 2012) (finding general jurisdiction without
any sign of physical presence).
41. DaimlerChrysler Tr. at 55-56 ("[d]o you really care how we do it? ... why don't we just say, simply,
exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable in this case?") (Sotomayor, J.).
42. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
43. Fiore v. Walden, 688 F.3d 558, 570-71 (9th Cir. 2012).
44. Id. at 5 71.
45. Id. at 571-72.
46. Id. at 573.
47. Id. at 576.
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sonal jurisdiction, where foreseeability reigns supreme and purposefil direction is
irrelevant."
4
At oral argument, the Court appeared similarly skeptical, with Justice Ginsberg charac-
terizing the case as "about as far out as any specific jurisdiction case I know." 49 If the
Court finds jurisdiction lacking, once again its approach will be key. The Court could
narrow the Calder doctrine, eliminate the "effects" jurisdiction altogether, or leave the
issue to fiture cases. The case could be critical for a growing number of cases involving
intentional torts committed entirely through the Internet but arguably have "effects" in
other forums.50
IV. The Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine is a prudential limitation on the exercise of judicial review
requiring U.S. courts to decline to pass judgment on the validity of official acts of a for-
eign State performed in its own territory.5 '
A. SOVEREIGN AS PLAINTIFF UNDERMINES APPLICABILITY
In The Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, the Southern District of New York rejected the
contention that the act of state doctrine barred the current Iraqi government from claim-
ing that defendants conspired with the Saddam Hussein regime to frustrate the United
Nation's Oil-for-Food Programme. 2 Following decisions in cases involving regime
changes in other countries, the court focused on the fact that "the current government of
Iraq itself has sought out [U.S.] courts" and "has called into question the validity of the
prior government's acts" and thus found that the government's "attempts to repudiate the
acts of the Hussein regime" precluded any basis for the defendants to invoke the
doctrine.5 3
B. UNITED STATES AS PLAINTIFF, SPECIFICITY REQUIREMENTS
In United States v. One Gul#itream G- Vet Aircraft, the federal government sought for-
feiture of a jet owned by Equatorial Guinea's Minister of Forestry and Agriculture, argu-
ing that the jet was purchased with fumds derived from extortion, misappropriation, theft,
and embezzlement s4 The Minister argued for dismissal on grounds that included the act
of state doctrine. The D.C. Circuit found any claim under the doctrine to be "weakened
when the Executive Branch of the United States is the party that brings suit," which ne-
gates the rationale of keeping the judiciary from intervening in matters that could influ-
ence foreign relations.5 5 The court also declined to apply the doctrine because the
48. Id. at 568.
49. Transcript of Oral Argument, Walden v. Fiore, 688 F.3d 558 (2013) (No. 12-574).
50. See, e.g., Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 706 (7th Cir. 2010) (jurisdiction under Calder test sus-
tained when tort committed via internet but "brunt of injury" was felt in Illinois).
51. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964).
52. Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 920 F. Supp. 2d 517, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
53. Id. at 534. The court dismissed on other grounds.
54. United States v. One Gulfstream G-VJet Aircraft, 941 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2013).
55. Id. at 11.
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Minister failed to identify any specific official acts whose validity the forfeiture would
question, noting that the "doctrine is not a principle of abstention" or "a complete bar to
suit whenever the case touches upon the realm of foreign affairs."56
C. SOVEREIGN VERSUS COMMERCIAL ACTS
In De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, heirs of a Jewish Hungarian art collector brought an
action against Hungary regarding the Hungarian government's confiscation of the
Herzog Collection in collaboration with Nazi Germany.5 7 Plaintiffs alleged that, follow-
ing World War II, the Hungarian government entered into bailment agreements with the
collector's heirs so that the works could continue to be displayed in Hungary, subject to
the works' return to the plaintiffs on demand, which the government allegedly breached
when it failed to return the works to the heirs.58 The court rejected Hungary's invocation
of the act of state doctrine, finding that the alleged breaches of the bailment agreements
concerned "not sovereign acts, but rather commercial acts, entitled to no deference under
the act of state doctrine."5 9
D. DETERMINING WHETHER VALIDITY OF SOVEREIGN ACTS IS QUESTIONED
In Kaplan v. Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, victims and family members
brought suit under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) and the Alien Tort Statute against two
banks, alleging that they aided in fumding Hezbollah rocket attacks on civilians along
Israel's northern border in 2006.60 Defendants sought to dismiss on act-of-state -doctrine
grounds, arguing that the adjudication of plaintiffs' claims would require the court to
"determine the validity of Israel's contention that a state of war ... existed at the time of
the attacks" because the ATA excepts "act[s] of war." 61 The court refused to invoke the
doctrine, finding that it "need not inquire into the validity" of Israel's determination, be-
cause a finding that the attacks constituted terrorism under the ATA (which the court
declined to make) "would not overrule the Israeli description of the attacks as 'war.' "62
V. International Discovery
A. OBTAINING UNITED STATES DISCOVERY FOR USE IN FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS
In 2013, several U.S. courts addressed the requirements for obtaining discovery for use
in foreign proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) and the factors set out in Intel
Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.63 The Fifth Circuit held, in Republic of Ecuador v.
56. Id.
57. See De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 714 F.3d 591, 595-96 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
58. Id. at 596.
59. Id. at 604 (internal quotations omitted).
60. Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of Republic of Iran, 2013 WL 4427943 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2013).
61. Id. at *8.
62. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
63. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1782(a) (West 2012) (authorizing a district court to order a person residing in the
district "to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in
a foreign or international tribunal"); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 243 (2004).
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Connor, that Chevron was judicially estopped from arguing that an investment arbitration
conducted pursuant to UNCITRAL rules was not a "foreign or international tribunal"
under section 1782, after Chevron had benefited repeatedly from taking a contrary posi-
tion in other proceedings. 64 Although the Fifth Circuit has previously held that invest-
ment arbitration is not a "foreign or international tribunal" under section 1782, the court
declared that "law of the circuit" is not "an antidote to judicial estoppel."65
Consistent with the Fifth Circuit's ruling in other cases (in which judicial estoppel was
not implicated), the Central District of California held that a private arbitration under the
American Arbitration Association International Dispute Resolution Procedures is not one
held before a "foreign or international tribunal."66 The district court acknowledged the
circuit split between the Second, Fifth, and the Eleventh Circuits but was "convinced by
the legislative history and policy arguments" articulated by the former.67
Two federal district courts in Florida rendered decisions interpreting the statutory re-
quirement that discovery be "for use in a proceeding" in a foreign or international tribu-
nal. Under Intel, such proceedings need not be imminent or pending; it is enough that
they "be within reasonable contemplation. ' 6 In In re Pott, the court found no foreign
proceeding within reasonable contemplation when the applicant merely relied on a "cur-
sory mention of a potential arbitration." 69 By contrast, in In re Pimenta, the same court
held that a foreign proceeding was within reasonable contemplation when the parties'
settlement agreement specifically contemplated a subsequent Brazilian proceeding.70
B. OBTAINING DISCOVERY FROM ABROAD FOR USE IN U.S. PROCEEDINGS
In 2013, the Second Circuit and courts in the Southern District of New York consid-
ered the discretionary factors in Societe Nationale Industrielle A&ospatiale v. U.S. District
Courtfor the Southern District of Iowa in evaluating discovery requests for information lo-
cated in foreign jurisdictions for use in U.S. proceedings.71 In Linde v. Arab Bank, P.L.C.,
the Second Circuit refised to issue a writ of mandamus vacating an order for sanctions
following a foreign bank's failure to comply with a production order in a terrorism-financ-
ing suit.72 The Second Circuit recognized that U.S. and foreign state interests in deter-
64. Republic of Ecuador v. Connor, 708 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 2013).
65. Id. at 657.
66. In re Dubey, 949 F. Supp. 2d 990, 993 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
67. Id. at 995.
68. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 259.
69. In re Port, No. 12-24515-CIV, 2013 WL 3189262, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2013).
70. In re Pimenta, 942 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1287 (S.D. Fla. 2013).
71. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522,
539 (1987) (holding that the Hague Convention is not the exclusive means for obtaining evidence located
abroad); RESTATErMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442(1)(c) (1987) (setting out five factors:
(1) "the importance to the ... litigation of the documents or other information requested"; (2) "the degree of
specificity of the request"; (3) "whether the information originated in the United States"; (4) "the availability
of alternative means of securing the information"; and (5) "the extent to which noncompliance with the
request would undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would
undermine important interests of the state where the information is located"). Courts in the Second Circuit
also consider "the hardship of compliance on the party or witness from whom discovery is sought ... [and]
the good faith of the party resisting discovery." Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D.
517, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
72. Linde v. Arab Bank, P.L.C., 706 F.3d 92, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2013).
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ring terrorism trumped the harm created by requiring the foreign bank to disclose
confidential information in violation of foreign bank secrecy laws.
7 3
In another terrorism financing suit, Wultz v. Bank of China, Ltd., the Southern District
Court of New York ordered the Bank of China (BOC) to disclose its communications with
the Chinese government regarding potential terrorism transactions after the BOC raised
an untimely state secrets claim, even though the court recognized such disclosure could
chill future such communications and potentially undermine Chinese and U.S. efforts to
combat terrorism. 74 Similarly, in Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, the district court granted a
motion for discovery sanctions against a New York attorney and his clients (who had ob-
tained an Ecuadorian judgment against Chevron), holding that the U.S. interest in com-
bating corruption outweighed Ecuador's interest in ensuring compliance with a decision
of its courts, particularly given that Ecuador did not intervene or comment on the issue
before the district court.75
In analyzing hardship of compliance, Southern District of New York courts refused to
compel production from non-party banks when, unlike the parties opposing discovery in
the cases discussed above, 76 the banks established that they faced non-speculative risks of
punishment for disclosure under foreign secrecy laws. In Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan,
Judge Rakoff did not require a non-party bank to provide discovery, because the bank had
demonstrated "a meaningful risk that it would face substantial criminal, civil, and regula-
tory penalties" for disclosure in Jordan and the United Arab Emirates.77 Similarly, in CE
Int'l Res. Holdings, L.L. C. v. S.A. Minerals Ltd. P'ship, Magistrate Judge Netburn declined
to order discovery on the basis that production would put a non-party bank and its em-
ployees at risk of criminal sanctions under Singapore bank secrecy laws.78
Finally, in Eikenberry v. Celsteel Ltd., the Southern District Court of New York declined
to create a bright-line rule that would require a party seeking depositions of foreign wit-
nesses to proceed through the Hague Convention.79 The court rejected the suggestion by
other courts that the Aerospatiale balancing test applies only to written communications
and not to depositions.8 0
VI. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law
A. ALIEN TORT STATUTE
A closely divided Supreme Court significantly limited the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)81 in
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.8 2 Reinforcing the presumption against extraterritorial
73. Id. at 112.
74. Wultz v. Bank of China, Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 2d 452, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
75. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 0691(LAK), 2013 WL 5575833, at *25-26 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10,
2013).
76. Linde, 706 F.3d at 114; Wultz, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 467; Donziger, 2013 WL 5575833, at *27.
77. Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 293 F.R.D. 595, 600 (S.D.N.Y 2013).
78. CE Int'l Res. Holdings, L.L.C. v. S.A. Minerals Ltd. P'ship, No. 12-CV-08087 (CM)(SN), 2013 'WL
2661037, at *14-16 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013).
79. Eikenberry v. Celsteel Ltd., No. 13 Civ. 4661(AT), 2013 'WL 5308028, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2013).
80. Id.
81. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2012).
82. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
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application, the Court held that federal courts may not hear common law claims arising
from conduct occurring on foreign territory. 3 The Court, however, left open "significant
questions" regarding the reach of the ATS.84 Applying Kiobel, lower courts have dismissed
common law ATS claims predicated on foreign conduct.85 But they have disagreed about
whether the extraterritoriality presumption can be overridden based on case-specific con-
siderations, as opposed to Congressional intent behind the statute generally. The Second
Circuit rejected such an effort when it refised to permit ATS claims of U.S. nationals
predicated on allegedly compelling U.S. interests.86 Similarly, two district courts disal-
lowed claims that allegedly had a significant connection to the United States.87 By con-
trast, another district court permitted claims by victims of the bombing of the U.S.
embassy in Kenya, finding a close connection to U.S. national interests.88
B. SECURITIES LAW
Extending the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Morrison v. Nat'l Australian
Bank,89 the Second Circuit, in United States v. Vilar, held that section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act does not apply extraterritorially in criminal actions.90 Following
Morrison, the Southern District of New York concluded that section 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933 similarly requires that the relevant offer of securities be made in the United
States. 91 The Southern District also continued to refine the application of the Second
Circuit's test for determining when a security not listed on a U.S. exchange constitutes a
"domestic transaction" subject to section 10(b)92 in Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd.
v. Ficeto.93 The Southern District of New York also concluded that, under Morrison, the
Anti-Retaliation Provision of the Dodd-Frank Act 94 does not apply extraterritorially. 95
Several district courts assumed, without analysis, that section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank
Act96 supersedes Morrison, resurrecting the prior "conducts and effects" test for SEC's
83. Id. at 1664-69.
84. Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 1669-70 (Alito, J., concurring).
85. See, e.g., Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 188-93 (2d Cir. 2013); Ben-Haim v. Neeman, No. 13-
1522, 2013 WL 5878913, at *2 (3d Cir. Nov. 4, 2013); Al Shimari v. CACI Int'l, 951 F. Supp. 2d 857, 868
(E.D. Va. 2013); Giraldo v. Drummond Co., No. 2:09 CV-1041 RDP, 2013 WL 3873960, at *5-9 (N.D. Ala.
July 25, 2013).
86. Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 189-92.
87. Al Shimari, 951 F. Supp. 2d 857, 865-68 (E.D. Va. 2013).
88. Mwani v. Bin Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3-4 (D.D.C. 2013).
89. Morrison v. Nat'l Australian Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
90. United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 71-76 (2d Cir. 2013).
91. SEC v. Fabrice Tourre, 10 Civ. 3229 (KBF), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78297, at *19-27 (S.D.N.Y. June
4, 2013).
92. See, e.g., Arco Capital Corps. Ltd., v. Deutsche Bank AG, 949 F. Supp. 2d 532, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (a
securities transaction is "domestic" when the purchaser transmits funds in New York and the contract be-
comes irrevocable); see also In re Satyam Computer Servs. LTD Sec. Litig., 915 F. Supp. 2d 450, 473-76
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (placing securities purchase orders from the United States is insufficient, as is listing of a
company's ADSs on a domestic exchange).
93. Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2012).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012).
95. Liuv. Siemens A.G., 13 Civ. 317 (WHP), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151005, at*7-11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21,
2013).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(c) (2010).
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enforcement actions, but after a detailed statutory analysis the Northern District of Illi-
nois expressed skepticism about this conclusion. 97
C. CRIMINAL LAW
In United States v. Carvajal, the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the Mari-
time Drug Law Enforcement Act 98 applies extraterritorially to foreign nationals engaged
in an international drug trafficking conspiracy, even when the nationals are not present
aboard drug-transporting vessels. 99 Both the D.C. Circuit and the Fourth Circuit found
jurisdiction over individuals who aided and abetted piracies on high seas, even though
their involvement was limited to acts committed on land and in territorial waters.1 00 The
two circuits also reaffirmed extraterritorial application of the hostage-taking statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1203.101
VII. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
The New York Convention governs the confirmation and enforcement of foreign arbi-
tral awards in most cases.10 2 State law governs the recognition of foreign money
judgments.10 3
A. FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
In Bakoss v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London Issuing Certificate, the Second Cir-
cuit, for the first time, "directly addressed whether federal courts should look to state law
or federal common law for the definition of 'arbitration' under the [Federal Arbitration
Act]."10 4 The court observed that the federal circuits are split on the issue, with the First,
Sixth, and Tenth Circuits applying federal law, and the Fifth and Ninth Circuits applying
state law.105 The Second Circuit joined the federal law side of the split, noting that its
holdings were consistent with "congressional intent to create a uniform national arbitra-
97. SEC v. A Chicago Convention Ctr., No. 13 C 982, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109936, at *15-33, 19 n.2
(N.D. 111. Aug. 6, 2013).
98. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501-08 (2008).
99. United States v. Carvajal, 924 F. Supp. 2d 219, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
100. United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233, 239-41 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929,
938-41 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
101. Sbih r, 722 F.3d at 246; Ali, 718 F.3d at 943.
102. See generally U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517. It is implemented in U.S. law through Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (2012). The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion governs the recognition and enforcement of awards if a majority of the parties to an arbitration agree-
ment are citizens of states that have ratified the convention, and this convention is implemented in U.S. law
through Chapter 3 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-07 (2012).
103. Many states have passed some version of the Uniform Foreign-Country MoneyJudgments Recognition
Act. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY
MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (July 21-28, 2005), available at http://www.uriformlaws.org/
shared/docs/foreign% 20country% 20money% 2Ojudgments% 2Orecognition/ufcmjra-final_05 .pdf.
104. Bakoss v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London Issuing Certificate, 707 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir.
2013).
105. Id. at 143.
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tion policy."'01 6 By contrast, the court in Bakoss found that the Fifth and Ninth Circuit
decisions had "articulated few reasons" for applying state law and that adopting their ap-
proach would contravene the intent of Congress by creating "a patchwork in which the
FAA will mean one thing in one state and something else in another."'107
In First Investment Corp. of the Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd., the
Fifth Circuit considered "whether a court may dismiss a petition to confirm a foreign
arbitration award for lack of personal jurisdiction" under the New York Convention, 0 8
notwithstanding the fact that personal jurisdiction is not among the seven enumerated
grounds in the Convention for denying confirmation.10 9 The court answered in the af-
firmative, consistent with decisions from the several other circuits, rejecting First Invest-
ment's argument that a defendant's substantive rights are unaffected in a confirmation
proceeding." 0 The court held that, even if those rights were unaffected, that "would do
nothing to alleviate the constitutional protections that enable a party to defend itself
against being called into court in a jurisdiction with which the party has no contacts.""'
The court explained that, because the New York Convention "is an exercise of presidential
and congressional power, whereas personal jurisdiction is grounded in constitutional due
process concerns, . . . the Constitution takes precedence." ' 1 2
B. FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS
In Naoko Ohno v. Yuko Yasuma, the Ninth Circuit considered a novel argument raised by
the defendant, a church located in Japan, that a Japanese judgment obtained against it for
fraudulent inducement to transfer assets should not be recognized under California's Uni-
form Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, because it imposed liability
for its religious teachings in violation of its right to free exercise of religion." 3 But the
court did not reach the complicated question of whether the First Amendment covered
the conduct at issue and instead utilized the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Company, to hold that the enforcement of a "foreign -country
money judgment by a domestic court does not constitute domestic state action triggering
constitutional scrutiny.""14 In Naoko Ohno, the Ninth Circuit noted that, in the context of
the enforcement of an order to pay a pre-determined amount of money,
the connection between the narrow domestic court order and the asserted violation
by the foreign court of substantive rights protected by our Constitution is simply too
attenuated, without more, to attribute responsibility for the merits of the underlying
judgment to a domestic state actor. And, standing alone, the order-to pay money to
someone-does not mandate a constitutionally protected act." 5
106. Id.
107. Id. at 144 (internal citations oritted).
108. First Inv. Corp. of the Marshall Islands v. Fujian Mawei Shipbuilding, Ltd., 703 F.3d 742, 744 (5th Cir.
2013).
109. Id. at 748.
110. Id. at 751.
111. Id. at 752.
112. Id. at 750.
113. Ohno v. Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 986-87 (9th Cir. 2013).
114. Id. at 992.
115. Id. at 1000.
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VIII. Forum Non Conveniens
The Galbert v. West Caribbean Airways litigation remains at the cutting edge of the fbrum
non conveniens doctrine." 6 In Galbert, the Eleventh Circuit held that plaintiffs must chal-
lenge the availability of an alternate forum at the motion-to- dismiss stage of litigation to
preserve this issue, even if the alternate forum ultimately proves unavailable.II
The plaintiffs in Galbert brought suit against various defendants in connection with an
aircraft that crashed while en route between Florida and the French jurisdiction of Marti-
nique." 8 Under the Montreal Convention (which governs international airline accident
litigation), the plaintiffs were entitled to bring suit in either Florida or Martinique, and
they chose Florida.11 9 When the defendants moved to dismiss in favor of Martinique
under the doctrine of frum non conveniens, the plaintiffs failed to argue that Martinique
was unavailable.1 20 The district court specifically noted that the plaintiffs "did not dispute
[that] Martinique was an adequate alternative forum," and the defendants prevailed in
dismissing the action.' 2'
The plaintiffs next filed suit in Martinique-but contested jurisdiction there them-
selves.122 When Martinique's highest court agreed and dismissed the case, the plaintiffs
returned to the Southern District of Florida and moved to set aside the prior dismissal
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), the "catch-all" provision permitting a
court to set aside a judgment when justice requires. 23
The Southern District of Florida refised to set aside the prior dismissal, and the Elev-
enth Circuit affirmed, holding that the "appropriate time for a plaintiff to argue the un-
availability of an alternate forum is in their brief opposing a defendant's motion to dismiss
based on forum non conveniens."12 4 Because the issue was not properly briefed at the
outset, the court refised to consider evidence that Martinique was actually unavailable, as
pled in plaintiffs' Rule 60(b)(6) motion. 125 The court added an observation that the
Galbert plaintiffs may have failed to raise the unavailability of Martinique at the proper
procedural time for strategic reasons.1 26
In a decision that may create new liability for corporations working with partner entities
abroad, the Fourth Circuit, in DiFederico v. Marriott International, Inc., reversed a district
court's decision to dismiss a wrongful death suit onfhrum non convenienv grounds1 27 The
plaintiffs, family members of an individual killed during a bombing at the Marriott Is-
lamabad Hotel in 2008, alleged that Marriott failed to design a satisfactory security proto-
col for implementation by its franchisee hotel partner, a Pakistani hotel company that the
116. See generally Galbert v. West Caribbean Airways, 714 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2013).
117. Id. at 1295.
118. Id. at 1292.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1292.
122. Galbert v. West Caribbean Airways, 714 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2013).
123. Id. at 1294.
124. Id. at 1295.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. DiFederico v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 714 F.3d 796, 804 (4th Cir. 2013).
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plaintiffs did not sue.1" 8 The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's fbrum non con-
veniens dismissal on the ground that it would be unfair and unsafe to force the plaintiffs to
return to the site of the hotel bombing and on the ground that the plaintiffs' allegations
ran against Marriott, which counted Maryland as its "legal backyard."12 9
Finally, a case from the Northern District of California emphasizes the importance of
forum selection clauses in contracts with international dimensions. In Kedkad v. Microsoft
Corp., the plaintiff initially signed an agreement to litigate disputes with his employer in
Libya, the place where the work under the contract was to be performed. 130 The parties,
however, executed a subsequent contract that omitted the forum selection clause but bore
additional indicia that the parties intended to litigate in Libya.13 1 Even so, noting that the
"doctrine of forum non conveniens is a drastic exercise of the court's power," the District
Court for the Northern District of California declined to dismiss the case in favor of
Libyan jurisdiction.132 The Kedkad decision is a warning that parties contracting abroad
but expecting to litigate potential contractual disputes at home should strictly maintain
specific contractual language to that effect.
IX. Parallel Proceedings
A. INTERNATIONAL ABSTENTION
Applying Second Circuit precedent,133 the Southern District of New York granted two
stays on the basis of international abstention. The court in Ole Media Management, L.P. v.
EMIApril Music, Inc. stayed the case because a parallel Canadian lawsuit would have "sig-
nificant bearing, and res judicata effect" on the litigation.134 The court refused to dismiss
the case, however, because the issues were not identical and dismissal would prejudice the
plaintiff.135 The court, in Taraziv. Truehope Inc., similarly granted a stay because a parallel
Canadian proceeding would have significant bearing on the pending litigation, and the
parties and issues were substantially similar.136 Although the two lawsuits were filed close
in time, discovery had already begun in Canada but not in New York, favoring the stay.137
By contrast, in LG Display Co. v. Obayashi Seikou Co., the District of Columbia District
Court refused a stay given the absence of "evidence suggesting that the Japanese litigation
concerns the three [U.S.] patents at the heart of this suit.' ' 1 3 s In analogous reasoning, the
Middle District of North Carolina concluded, in RF Micro Devices, Inc. v. Xiang, that ab-
stention was not warranted when it was unclear whether the contract and copyright claims
128. Id. at 800-02.
129. Id. at 808.
130. Kedkad v. Microsoft Corp., No. C13-0141 TEH, 2013 WL 5945807 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2013).
131. For example, the contract was performed entirely in Libya and called for Libyan law to apply. See id. at
*1-2.
132. Id. at *3.
133. See Royal & Sun Alliance Ins. Co. of Canada v. Century Int'l Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2006).
134. Ole Media Mgmt., L.P. v. EMI April Music, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 7249(PAE), 2013 WL 2531277, at *3-4
(S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2013).
135. Id. at *5.
136. Tarazi v. Truehope Inc., No. 13 Civ. 1024(LAK)(JCF), 2013 WL 3820664, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 24,
2013).
137. Id. at *6.
138. LG Display Co. v. Obayashi Seikou Co., 919 F. Supp. 2d 17, 24 (D.D.C. 2013).
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at issue had "close counterparts" in the parallel Chinese proceeding. 39 Meanwhile, in
RSM Richter, Inc. v. Behr America, Inc., the Sixth Circuit reversed a district court's decision
to abstain in favor of a Canadian bankruptcy proceeding.14 0 The court observed that ab-
stention "only frustrates the interests of international comity-by denying the Canadian
estate monies to which it might well be entitled."141
B. INTERNATIONAL COMITY
Noting the defendants' refisal to rely on the international abstention doctrine, the
Northern District of California, in Oak Point Partners, Inc. v. Lessing, applied a restrictive
Ninth Circuit test to conclude that dismissal was not warranted when there was no "true
conflict" between domestic and foreign laws.142 While agreeing that such conflict would
exist if German law granted exclusive jurisdiction to the German courts, the court thought
comity was best served by allowing the German courts to determine that jurisdictional
issue. 143 By contrast, in Oui Financing LLC v. Dellar, the court applied the more malleable
Second Circuit test in declining to adjudicate a creditor claim the subject of a foreign pre-
insolvency safeguard proceeding, because the foreign proceeding was procedurally fair and
did not contravene public policy.144
C. ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS
Applying Ninth Circuit law, the Federal Circuit in Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v.
Genentech, Inc. affirmed a district court's decision not to enjoin a parallel arbitration, con-
cluding that the issues in the two proceedings were different.145 In addition, enjoining the
arbitration, which had been agreed to by the parties in their contract, would frustrate the
strong U.S. policy in favor of forum selection.146 In Sonera Holding B. V. v. Cukurova Hold-
ing A.S., the Southern District of New York granted an injunction when the foreign ac-
tion-a request for an injunction against the New York litigation to enforce a prior
arbitration award-threatened the court's jurisdiction and would frustrate a public policy
favoring enforcement of arbitration clauses.147 In Alstom Chile S.A. v. Mapfre Compania de
Seguros Generales Chile S.A., the same district court found an injunction appropriate when
a party initiated the foreign suit in an attempt to sidestep arbitration. 14 s
In Bailey Shipping v. American Bureau of Shipping, the Southern District of New York
granted in part and denied in part a motion for a preliminary injunction, focusing on the
139. RF Micro Devices, Inc. v. Xiang, No. 1:12CV967, 2013 'WL 5462295, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 30,
2013).
140. See RSM Richter, Inc. v. Behr America, Inc., 729 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 2013).
141. Id. at 558.
142. Oak Point Partners, Inc. v. Lessing, No. 11-CV-03328-LHK, 2013 WL 1703382 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19,
2013).
143. Id. at *4-5.
144. Oi Fin. LLC v. Dellar, No. 12 Civ. 7744(RA), 2013 WL 5568732, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2013).
145. Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v. Genentech, Inc., 716 F.3d 586, 593 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
146. Id. at 593-94.
147. Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., No. 11 Civ. 8909(DLC), 2013 WL 2050914, at *2-3
(S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2013).
148. Alstom Chile S.A. v. Mapfre Compania de Seguros Generales Chile S.A., No. 13 Civ. 2416 (LTS)
(DCF), 2013 WL 5863547, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2013).
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question of whether the requested arbitration would be dispositive of the Greek litigation
the defendant sought to enjoin. 149 The court concluded that, although the arbitration
would be dispositive of the plaintiff's claims under international conventions and Greek
regulatory statutes, it would not be dispositive of the claims under Greek consumer pro-
tection law.150
149. Bailey Shipping v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, No. 12 Civ. 5959(KPF), 2013 WL 5312540, at *8-9
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2013).
150. Id. at *11-13.
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